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Abstract
We study settings where agents with private information face a variety of issues
and must take an action with respect to each issue. For any given issue the order at
which agents take actions is random and each agent acts once. An agent’s choice of
action depends on his private information as well as what he can deduce from observing
relevant actions previously taken by predecessors. It is well known that whenever agents
observe all predecessors they may run into an ‘information cascade’ resulting in a herd
on the inferior action. We depart from the classical in three aspects. First, agents can
only observe part of the population (modeled as neighbors on some undirected graph).
Second, agents face many decision problems and not just a single one, and finally, we
assume that the arrival order of the agents is unknown.
The central question we pose ask whether there is a natural observability graph
that prevents the aforementioned information cascade phenomenon for any single issue
and for all issues together. We introduce the ‘celebrities graph’ and prove that indeed
it allows for proper information aggregation in large populations in a multiple issues
setting, even when the order at which agents decide is random and even when different
issues are decided in different orders. The celebrities graph can be viewed as an asymp-
totic version of preferential attachment graphs, which arguably describe the evolution
of real-world social networks. We complement the theoretical model with simulations
of social learning over preferential attachment graphs and demonstrate the robustness
of our results.
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1 Introduction
When making decisions on various topics we often turn to see how our colleagues, friends
and family members decided in similar circumstances. By doing so we harness the collective
knowledge with the hope of making better informed decisions. Such decisions pertain to
multiple issues such as the choice of a restaurant, a mortgage plan, a service provider and
so on. Anytime we face a new decision problem we turn to look at those among our friend
that have already faced a similar dilemma and have made a decision. As the order by which
decisions are made differ from one issue to another it may well be the case that for an
individual agent, the relevant circle of influence changes from one issue to another.
Learning from what others do introduces an inherent trap, known as an ‘information
cascade’. Under information cascade an initial set of agents is, due to sheer misfortune,
ill-informed. As a result these agents take some inferior action. Subsequent agents are then
convinced that the aforementioned action is optimal (“how can so many agents be wrong?”)
and so dismiss their own private information and follow the herd by taking the inferior action
as well.
The herding literature typically (and implicitly) assumes all agents are familiar with
each other in the sense that an agent always observes the choice of action made by all its
predecessors in this sequential decision making process. In reality, however, this is hardly
the case and we mostly view only a subset of predecessors. This turns out to be key in
circumventing the information cascade problem.
Whereas partial observability seems to diminish the risk of an information cascade it
introduces a new difficulty to social learning. If people observe less peers then there may be
no hope for the collective knowledge to be aggregated and for learning to occur. Consider
an extreme case, when agents never observe each other. Obviously no information cascades
will occur yet no one can enjoy the collective knowledge. As a result many agents are
bound to take an inferior action. In this paper we identify a natural observability graph
that is sufficiently sparse to avoid information cascades but is also sufficiently dense to allow
aggregation of information.
In fact, the observation graph we identify, allows for simultaneous learning over multiple
issues. Each issue is associated with its optimal action and with a (random) order by which
people make their decision. The latter suggests two inherent difficulties: First, agents see the
action chosen by the neighbors on the observation graph without knowing the information
based on which these actions were taken. Second, the same graph must be relevant to all
issues and cannot be designed in an online manner to fit the order at which agents choose
(for more on this see section 1.2).1
1For a single issue and a deterministic order over the agents it is quite trivial how to mitigate information
cascades and guarantee learning with partial observability. We do so in the sequel.
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1.1 Our contributions
Our primary contribution is identifying the celebrities graph and showing its power in ag-
gregating information for arbitrary sets of issues. The celebrities graph we introduce is a
complete bi-partite graph with a small minority of the agents on one side (the ‘celebrities’)
and with the rest of agents on the other side (the ‘commoners’). We use the term celebrities
graph as it reminiscent of a social structures where a small set of individuals, a-priori simi-
lar to all other agents, emerge as opinion leaders (celebrities). These opinion leaders have a
knack at distilling what the crowds will desire by monitoring many individuals and detecting
early fads while the commoners primarily look up to these opinion leaders.
We provide three theoretical results regarding learning with the celebrities graph:
• Our first result proves that learning is guaranteed with high probability when agents
random order is drawn uniformly for each issue and independent across issues.
• Although a uniform distribution on the order of agents is quite natural (e.g., when
each agent makes his move according to some Poisson clock) one can naturally inquire
whether a similar construct exists for arbitrary distributions. To this end we prove
that a version of the celebrities graph guarantees learning. The specific structure
of the graph, in particular, which agents become celebrities and which commoners,
depends on the details of those distributions.
• The previous observation builds on our third result. We show that a random version
of the celebrities graph allows for learning even if the order at which agents make
decisions is chosen in an adversarial manner. By this we mean that an adversary can
choose the decision making order after learning the details of the observability graph.
The intuition behind the success of the celebrity graph to aggregate information is quite
straightforward. With high probability we expect a large number of commoners to arrive
first. In such an event the first celebrity to arrive observes a large independent sample and
so is likely to take the optimal action. Any subsequent agent will be better off mimicking
that celebrity.
We, furthermore, briefly discuss the difficulty with constructing an optimal observability
graph (as opposed to an ǫ-efficient graphs for large societies). We show that this turns out to
be a hard problem even when only a single issue is involved and the order by which decisions
are made is known in advance!
Using simulations we demonstrate the robustness of our theoretical results to ‘realistic’
networks and small populations. By realistic we refer to preferential attachment networks.
These are networks that form by attaching more vertices to a network where a new vertex’
inclination to link with an existing one is a function of the popularity of the latter, as
measured by the number of his neighbors. It has long been argued that the preferential
attachment process forms a high fidelity models for various existing social networks, with the
World Wide Web serving as a lead example[13]. Not only are preferential attachment graphs
realistic but they also induce graphs that are topologically close to our celebrities graphs with
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one major difference whereby celebrities are likely to connect with other celebrities.2 Whereas
our model assumes agents are Bayesian, we slightly depart from the Bayesian paradigm in
our simulation (due to its computational complexity) and replace it with a simple majority
rule (which is prevalent in the social learning literature, see [15]), whereby each agent follows
the majority action while accounting both for the private information as well as neighbors’
actions. This is a tractable approximation of the Bayesian optimal action each agent takes
in our theoretical analysis.
Our simulations show that scale-free graphs do indeed exhibit efficient learning of optimal
actions as compared with cliques and their efficiency levels converge to those obtained in the
celebrities graph. In particular, this suggests that the asymptotic efficiency results we obtain
are structurally robust.
We provide two possible ways to interpret the surprising benefits inherent in the celebrities
graph - a positive interpretation and a constructive one.
A positive interpretation
Is our celebrities graph a realistic depiction of actual social networks? We have already argued
that the celebrities graph is an extreme variant of preferential attachment graphs which, in
turn, are considered a good model for the graph structure in real scale-free networks. In this
case our results argue that for various networks, such as on-line social networks, one can
expect social learning.
With yet some more imagination one can possibly argue that the prevalence of celebrities
- opinion leaders with no apparent quality to justify this position - is a social structure that
has a very appealing property. Such a structure allows for efficient social learning.
A constructive interpretation
Historically, online social networks have emerged spontaneously. However, as more and more
of the social interaction takes place online these networks are now partly manipulated. For
example, some of the algorithms of networks such as Linkedin and Facebook are responsible
for those to whom we are introduced, while others prioritize the content we receive from
those we are already friends with. More generally, in some cases the set of agents observable
to any particular agent is also manipulated by some central designer (or mediator). Thus,
an alternative interpretation of our results is in the framework of mechanism design where a
crucial part of the mechanism is the network topology. Our results suggest how to structure
social networks when social learning is a desired property and when the network structure
cannot be dynamically adapted as issues arise.
2Adding links between celebrities in our celebrities graph will not effect the results reported here.
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1.2 Multi-issue and single issue learning.
A key technical lemma in our analysis shows that one can reduce any multi-issue problem
to some single issue problem (possibly with different parameters). This holds due to our
underlying assumptions that the primitives of the different issues, such as the optimal alter-
native, the order over the agents and the signals, are independent across the issues. This
begs the question of why should we study the multi-issue model to begin with and whether
it has its own merit. Our reply to such a hypothetical question is two fold. First, it may
not be obvious to the reader or to the practitioner that indeed the seemingly more complex
setting reduces to the simpler one. Second, for a single issue setting one could argue that the
network design need not take place ahead of time but rather in real time, as agents arrive.
This leads to a very simple solution, which we mention in the paper, and dub the ‘guinea-pig’
graph. However, for the multi-issue case the transition from an offline network design to an
online design does not seem so natural as the learning of the various issues takes place in
the different orders and in different time and an equivalent online design is not guaranteed.
1.3 Related literature
Our work is closely tied to an exciting branch of the economics literature studying the
celebrated herding model [6, 8]. This literature studies sequential information aggregation.
In this setting agents arrive one after the other, possibly in some random order, and each has
to choose some action. The value of each action is the same for all agents and depends on
some underlying unknown state of nature. Each agent privately receives a stochastic signal
(i.e. private information) that is correlated with the state of nature. Thus, the choice of
action for the agent arriving at stage t is based on his signal as well as actions chosen (and not
signals observed) by his predecessors. Using a similar framework to ours, the aforementioned
papers and most of the follow-up literature study a setting where all agents can observe each
other. The primary observation is that efficiency can only prevail, even when there is only
a single issue, whenever signals are unbounded ([20]). Signals are called bounded when the
ex-post probability of the true state of nature conditional on the signal is bounded away
from 1, across all states and all signals. In contrast we demonstrate an observability network
that supports efficient learning of multiple issues even when signals are bounded.
Restricting agents’ visibility in order to achieve efficiency was first proposed in [21]. Smith
shows that if there is a single issue and a known order in which decisions are taken then
one can restrict the visibility of some agents (use them as guinea-pigs) and enable efficient
learning as the size of society grows. For Smiths’ construction to work, the number of guinea-
pigs grows to infinity with population size while its proportion shrinks to zero. This feature
is employed in [18] that calculates the optimal sample size of guinea pigs for any population
size.
[1] studies random evolution of observability graphs and provides sufficient conditions
under which the number of guinea pigs in the realized graph grows to infinity while its
proportion shrinks to zero (as in Smith [21]). [16] provides an example where limited observ-
ability and random arrival entails learning even without the existence of guinea pigs. Note
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that [16], in contrast with the previous papers, considers a model with unbounded signals. [4]
consider a herding model over the m-dimensional random lattice and show that as a function
of the edge probability p of the random lattice, there exists a fixed proportion of agents ρmp
who asymptotically observe infinite number of isolated agents. [10] study a design question
where an observability graph is given but the designer has control over the order at which
decisions are made. In their model, in addition to the informational externalities, there are
also utilitarian externalities as the value of each action depends on the number of agents
that adopt it. Unfortunately, none of the aforementioned papers shed light on the existence
of an efficient network with multiple issues. A more general discussion of the herding topic,
and many related pointers can be found in [13].
The lion’s share of use of a network structure in multi-agent AI papers with self motivated
agents is to model the effect of players’ actions. In such models an agent’s utility is affected
by both his own action as well as those taken by his neighbors (e.g. [9, 5, 3]). In contrast,
our work uses the network structure to model information externalities.
Our work complements works on sequential voting with complete information in the CS
literature [22, 12]. Unlike the herding literature, in voting models multiplicity of issues was
previously studied. [23] study the case where multiple issues are presented to the voters
sequentially and the voting procedure is done sequentially for any issue separately. It turns
out that the order at which the issues are presented may effect the equilibrium outcome of
the voting game.
An alternative model of social learning is when a population of agents that act simul-
taneously and repeatedly, which is in contrast with our sequential setup. The centrality of
a small subset of agents, those we refer to as ‘celebrities’, plays a key role in those models.
In fact, whereas centrality of a small set of agents drives our positive results it appears as
an inhibitor of learning in that setting. This is true when agents are rational and maxi-
mize expected payoff while resorting to Bayes formula or when agents update action in some
ad-hoc non-Bayesian rule. In such models the population may gravitate towards the action
chosen by the celebrities and an initial bias of these celebrities then propagates to the whole
population (e.g., [14, 17]).
2 Model
Consider a set of N agents and K decision problems, hereinafter referred to as issues. With
each issue k we associate a weight, λk, which represents its social importance (we later on use
this to formalize our objective function). For each issue, k ∈ K an agent must choose one of
two actions in the set Ak = {0, 1}. The agents share a common utility function U =
∑
k U
k,
where Uk : Θk×Ak → R with Θk = {0, 1} being a binary set of states of nature. In particular
Uk(θ, a) = 1 whenever θ = a, and Uk(θ, a) = 0 otherwise.3 In addition each agent i occupies
a location (i.e., a node) in an undirected graph G with a set of vertices N and a set of edges
E which is called the social network. Each such issue, k ∈ K, is associated with a random
3The results reported here go through when agents use the more general weighted utility function, U =∑
k
λkUk, with arbitrary weights, λk > 0.
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permutation, σk : N → N , over the agents, which is the order at which agents take actions
(decide) on that issue. Let σk(i) denote the (random) stage at which agent i is called to
make a decision with respect to issue k. Let us denote by Probk(σ) the probability of the
permutation σ ∈ Σ, where Σ denotes the set of all permutations.
The social learning game is played as follows: For each issue k the state of nature θk is
drawn with equal probabilities and independently across issues. In addition a permutation,
σk over the agents is drawn according to some probability distribution. Time is discrete
and at time t agent i must choose an action, ak ∈ {0, 1}, with respect to issue k whenever
σk(i) = t. Agents do not know the chosen states nor the permutations, however each agent i
can observe a random signal ski ∈ S = {0, 1} with Prob(s
k
i = θ
k|θk) = 0.5+δk (0 < δk < 0.5).
Signals are drawn independently across agents and across issues conditional on the realized
states θk. In addition, before taking an action on issue k, every agent i observes the actions
taken by all agents j that preceded him on that issue and are also observable to i (Formally,
{j : σk(j) < σk(i) ∧ (i, j) ∈ E}).
From here on we will assume, for simplicity, that the signal structure is equal across
issues. Formally, δk = δ ∀k.4
Note that a social network induces a game of incomplete information among the agents.
In the Bayesian equilibrium of the game each agent maximizes expected utility subject to
her information. We assume for simplicity that if in equilibrium agent i is indifferent between
the two actions then she takes the action that is identical to her private signal.
Our formal objective is to identify an observability graph E that may depend on the
population size and various other primitives of the model (e.g., the set of issues, the signal
structure, the distributions over orders) that is ǫ-efficient:
Definition 2.1. The Observability graph (N,E) is called ǫ-efficient if
∀~θ = (θ1, θ2 . . . θK) ∈ {0, 1}k :
∑
k∈K
λk
∑
σ∈Σ
Probk(σ)
∑N
n=1 Prob(a
k
n = θ
k|σ, ~θ)
N
> 1− ǫ.
In words, we consider the expected proportion of individuals to make a correct decision
on issue k and require that their weighted average be larger than 1− ǫ.
Is there a social network that could mitigate information cascades for a given issue? Is
there one which could mitigate this for multiple issues? To demonstrate the subtlety of the
question let us consider two extreme network structures, where E = N × N or E = ∅. We
argue that both are not ǫ-efficient for small enough ǫ and for any issue, no matter at which
order agents decide. The fact that E = N × N is not efficient is a direct consequence of
informational cascades and potential herding when signals are bounded (which is the case
whenever the number of signals is finite as in our model), whereas the case for E = ∅ is
straightforward.
4Our results go through, with an adjustment of the size of population, whenever the set of parameters,
δk, are uniformly bounded away from 0 and 0.5.
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An intuitive approach that could result in positive results is a hybrid of the two afore-
mentioned approaches—to allow some agents to choose actions independently by restricting
them to not observe anyone else (to make a decision in isolation). Once sufficient observa-
tions have been made the optimal action is identified with high probability. We refer to the
set of agents that decide in isolation ‘guinea pigs’. Assume that for a given issue the initial
set of decision makers do not observe each other and so coincide with the set of guinea pigs
while all the followers can observe the guinea pigs. With high probability a majority of the
‘guinea-pigs’ will take the optimal action and all the followers can copy that action and so
social learning prevails. However if the set of guinea pigs does not coincide with the set of
first movers (which is highly likely when the order is random ) then such a network structure
will fail on the corresponding issue.
Our results will tackle ǫ-efficient social networks for sufficiently large societies under
different assumptions on the random permutations for the various issues:
• For all issues the permutations are drawn uniformly from the set of all permutations
and weights are arbitrary.
• Weights and permutations are determined by an adversary who is familiar with the
graph structure and wants to reduce the weighted efficiency.5
• Weights as well as random permutations are arbitrary but are known to the graph
designer.
Note that whereas the first and last scenarios are within a Bayesian paradigm the middle
one is not. For the first scenario we construct a simple graph, whereas for the last scenario
we prove that such a graph exists, but do not discuss how to construct such a graph given
the weights and permutation distributions. As for the adversarial case, we do provide an
explicit construction , albeit of a random graph. This is then use to prove existence for the
third scenario.
The basic network structure we propose will also do well when we extend the model
beyond the binary and beyond the symmetric case, although the exact size of the required
population, N , as a function of ǫ, the required proximity to efficiency, may change.6
3 Results
Before turning to discuss observability graphs for multi-issue learning we require two auxiliary
results. The first result discusses the simple case where only one issue is involved and the
order at which agents decide is deterministic. The obvious construction we consider will turn
out to be crucial for the general case. In fact, our second auxiliary result argues that solving
the single issue setting is without loss of generality when the order is random.
5Admittedly, this scenario is not well motivated, however this result is helpful in establishing our third
results for the general, non-adversary, weighted case.
6By symmetry we refer to the symmetry of the prior, and that of the distribution of signals.
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3.1 Auxiliary results
An important building block for our analysis is to understand how to construct an asymp-
totically optimal network for a single issue with a deterministic order. This proposed graph
for this case is based on the aforementioned guinea-pig approach.
Assume agents must decide on a single issue and that, without loss of generality, agent
i decides at time i (σ(i) = i). Consider a graph structure such that agents {1, . . . , N}
are guinea-pigs (they do not observe each other) and assume agent N + 1 observes all the
guinea-pigs. Let an denote the action of agent n. Then:
Lemma 3.1. If all agents are playing their best-response then∑N
n=1 an ≥
N
2
+ 1 =⇒ aN+1 = 1,∑N
n=1 an ≤
N
2
− 1 =⇒ aN+1 = 0 and otherwise aN+1 = sN+1.
In other words, whenever there is a clear majority for one action among the N guinea
pigs, agent N + 1 ignores his own signal and follows the majority.
We sketch the proof of this lemma which is quite straightforward: Note that a guinea pig
takes action θ whenever his signal is equal to θ. Therefore the condition
∑N
n=1 an ≥
N
2
+ 1
is the same as
∑N
n=1 sn ≥
N
2
+ 1. This implies that
∑N+1
n=1 sn >
N+1
2
, no matter what the
value of sN+1 is. This means that the majority of signals among agents 1, . . . , N + 1 is 1.
Knowing this, the optimal action for agent N +1 is to take action 1. The second case follows
symmetric arguments. As for the third case note that the condition implies that sN+1 equals
the (weak) majority signal among agents 1, . . . , N + 1 and the conclusion follows.
Lemma 3.2. Assume that E = ∅ (all agents are guinea pigs) and let X denote the number
of agents that take the correct action. Whenever N ≥ 1
4δ2ǫ
, Prob(X ≥ N+1
2
) > 1− ǫ.
See the appendix for the proof of Lemma 3.2.
The following corollary is immediate.
Corollary 3.3. For any ǫ > 0 there exists some integer Nˆ such that for any society with
more than Nˆ agents and any deterministic order there exists an ǫ-efficient guinea pig social
network.
Proof: Let Nˆ = 1
δ2ǫ2
and let the first K = 1
4δ2 ǫ
2
agents that are taking decision be the
guinea pigs. Hence, from Lemma 3.2 we get that with probability greater than (1− ǫ
2
) a clear
majority of the guinea pigs take the optimal action, θ. By Observation 3.1 we conclude that
when such a clear majority emerges all the remaining agents also take the action θ regardless
of their own signal. Denoting by X the number of agents which take action act θ we get:
E(X)
N
>
(N −K)(1− ǫ
2
)
N
≥ 1− ǫ
where the last inequality follows from our choice of Nˆ and K.
Q.E.D
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We now turn to argue that our model with multiple issues can be reduced to a single
issue model with a random permutation on the order of agents. That is, given a setting
with multiple issues we construct an alternative setting with a single issue such that any
ǫ-efficient observability graph for the latter is necessarily ǫ-efficient for the former.
Lemma 3.4. Consider a set of K issues with corresponding weights λk and random orders
with probabilities Probk. There exists a single issue setting with a permutation over the agents
such that if E is ǫ-efficient for the latter then it is also ǫ-efficient for the former. In particular
the probability of the permutation σ for the single issue is given by qσ =
∑
k∈K λ
kProbk(σ).
Proof: Recall the key term we compute to determine efficiency of ~θ is:
EFF (~θ) =
∑
k∈K
λk
∑
σ∈Σ
Probk(σ)
∑N
n=1 Prob(a
k
n = θ
k|σ, ~θ)
N
.
We can write this alternatively as:
EFF (~θ) =
∑
k∈K
λk
∑
σ∈Σ
Probk(σ)
∑N
n=1 Prob(a
k
σ−1(n) = θ
k|σ, ~θ)
N
.
As all issues have the same parameters (prior and signal structure) then for any permuta-
tion σ, the set of probabilities {Prob(ak
σ−1(n) = θ
k|σ, ~θ) : k ∈ K} are all equal Prob(aσ−1(n) =
θ|σ, ~θ), which is probability of a successful decision of the agent deciding at stage n in a
model with a unique issue and unique permutation, σ.
Therefore
EFF (~θ) =
∑
k∈K
λk
∑
σ∈Σ
Probk(σ)
∑N
n=1 Prob(aσ−1(n) = θ|σ,
~θ)
N
=
=
∑
σ∈Σ
∑
k∈K
[λkProbk(σ)]
∑N
n=1 Prob(aσ−1(n) = θ|σ,
~θ)
N
.
For any σ ∈ Σ let denote by qσ =
∑
k∈K λ
kProbk(σ). Note that the vector {qσ}σ∈Σ is a
probability vector over the set of permutations. Thus,
EFF (~θ) =
∑
σ∈Σ
qσ
∑N
n=1 Prob(aσ−1(n) = θ|σ,
~θ)
N
.
The latter term is the efficiency of the observability graph with a single issue and a
random permutation distributed according to the probabilities qσ. 
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3.2 Issues with a uniform distribution
In this subsection we focus on the case where for all issues the permutations all have equal
probabilities. Formally, probk(σ) = 1
N !
for all issues k and all permutations σ.
The idea we pursue is the following—designate agents 1, . . . ,M as ‘celebrities’, where
M will be determined in the sequel (any subset containing M agents would have worked as
well). Let the agents in the complementary set be known as ‘commoners’. The ‘celebrities
social network’ is a bi-clique with the M celebrities on one side and the N −M commoners
on the other side (a similar analysis will also go through if all celebrities connect to one
another, but commoners are not connected).
For what follows assume there is just one issue.
We now turn to show that for a random uniform order all celebrities are likely to be
absent from the set of agents that take decision initially. First we introduce the following
notation: for any M ⊂ N and a permutation σ let σ(M) = {σ(m) : m ∈M}.
Lemma 3.5. Fix two integers M and J and let N be large enough to satisfy N ≥ 2JM
ǫ
+ J .
Then any set of M agents (also denoted M) satisfies
Prob({σ{1, . . . , J} ∩M = ∅) ≥ 1− ǫ.
See the appendix for the proof of Lemma 3.5.
Note that whenever J is of the order of magnitude of Nǫ the conditions of Lemma 3.5
are violated. Indeed it is quite likely that at least one celebrity will take decision among the
first Nǫ agents, even when such celebrities are absent from the first J agents:
Lemma 3.6. For an arbitrary ǫ > 0 let M,J and N satisfy M ≥ 2
ǫ
ln(1
ǫ
) and N ≥ 2J
ǫ
.
Then,
Prob(σU{J + 1, ..., Nǫ} ∩M 6= ∅|σ{1, ..., J} ∩M = ∅) ≥ 1− ǫ.
See the appendix for the proof of Lemma 3.6.
Given ǫ > 0 and a set of N agents let H be the bi-clique with M = 8
ǫ
ln4
ǫ
celebrities and
N −M commoners (assume N is large enough so that this is well defined).
Lemma 3.7. For J ≥ 1
δ2ǫ
and ǫ ≤ 0.5− δ. Assuming agents 1, . . . , J are commoners, agent
J + 1 is a celebrity and agent J + 2 is a commoner and assume all agents are playing their
best reply. Then
∑J
h=1 an ≥
J
2
+ 1 =⇒ aJ+2 = 1 and
∑J
h=1 an ≤
J
2
− 1 =⇒ aJ+2 = 0.
Proof: We have already seen (observation 3.1) that in these cases agent J + 1 follows
the majority. Therefore it is enough to show that agent J + 2 necessarily mimics the action
of agent J + 1. This is clear when sJ+2 = aJ+1, namely the signal that agent J + 2 receives
is not in contradiction with the action taken by agent J + 1. Thus, it remains to show that
even when sJ+2 6= aJ+1 agent J + 2 will choose the action aJ+1. Without loss of generality
(WLOG) it is enough to prove this for the case aJ+1 = 1 and sJ+2 = 0. Formally, we need
to prove that Prob(θ = 1|aJ+1 = 1 ∩ SJ+2 = 0) > 0.5 whenever J ≥
1
δ2ǫ
.
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By Bayes rule Prob(θ = 1|aJ+1 = 1 ∩ SJ+2 = 0) =
Prob(θ=1)Prob(aJ+1=1∩SJ+2=0|θ=1)∑1
j=0 Prob(θ=j)Prob(aJ+1=1∩SJ+2=0|θ=j)
.
Note that conditional on θ the random variables aJ+1 and SJ+2 are independent. In
addition, Prob(SJ+2 = 0|θ = 1) = 0.5− δ, Prob(SJ+2 = 0|θ = 0) = 0.5 + δ and from lemma
3.2 and observation 3.1 Prob(aJ+1 = 1|θ = 1) ≥ 1 −
ǫ
4
and Prob(aJ+1 = 1|θ = 0) ≤
ǫ
4
whenever J ≥ 1
δ2ǫ
. Together with the trivial inequality Prob(aJ+1 = 1|θ = 1) ≤ 1 and since
ǫ ≤ (0.5− δ) we can conclude that:
Prob(θ = 1|aJ+1 = 1 ∩ SJ+2 = 0) ≥
0.5(1− ǫ
4
)(0.5− δ)
0.5(1)(0.5− δ) + 0.5 ǫ
4
(0.5 + δ)
≥
(1− ǫ
4
)(0.5− δ)
(0.5− δ) + (0.5−δ)
4
(1)
=
(1− ǫ
4
)
5
4
= 0.8−
ǫ
5
> 0.5

Lemma 3.8. For any ǫ > 0 there exists Nˆ such that for any N > Nˆ the social network H
is ǫ-efficient for a single issue and a uniform distribution.
Proof: WLOG we can assume that ǫ ≤ 0.5− δ.
Note that in the proof we use Lemmas 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and Observation 3.1 switching ǫ by ǫ
4
.
Let J = 1
δ2ǫ
, M = 8
ǫ
ln(4
ǫ
) and Nˆ = 128
ǫ3δ2
ln4
ǫ
= 28JM
ǫ
≥ 8JM
ǫ
+ J .
Let A be the event that among the first J agents that took decision there is at least one
agent from the set M and let B be the event that among the agents that took decision in
places J + 1 to N ǫ
4
there is no agent from the set M.
By Lemma 3.5 P (A) ≤ ǫ
4
which implies P (A¯) ≥ 1− ǫ
4
. By Lemma 3.6 P (B¯|A¯) ≥ (1− ǫ
4
)
and so P (B¯ ∩ A¯) ≥ (1− ǫ
4
)2.
E(X) = P (A)(E(X)|A)+P (A¯)[P (B|A¯)(E(X)|B∩A¯)+P (B¯|A¯)(E(X)|B¯∩A¯)] which implies
that E(X) ≥ P (B¯ ∩ A¯)E(X|B¯ ∩ A¯) ≥ (1− ǫ
4
)2E(X|B¯ ∩ A¯).
Assume we can show that E(X|B¯ ∩ A¯) ≥ (1 − ǫ
4
)(N − N ǫ
4
). Then we will be able to
conclude that E(X) ≥ (1− ǫ
4
)4N ≥ (1− ǫ)N as required.
To finish the proof we now show that indeed E(X|B¯ ∩ A¯) ≥ (1 − ǫ
4
)(N − N ǫ
4
). The
event A¯ implies that the initial set of J = 1
δ2ǫ
were all non-celebrities and hence observe no
predecessors. This means that they are all guinea pigs. Since B¯ occurred the first celebrity
took decision prior to time N ǫ
4
agents. This agent observed more than J guinea pigs. By
Lemma 3.2 a strict majority of these agents took the optimal action (their action equals their
signal) with probability greater than 1 − ǫ
4
. Therefore by observation 3.1 the first celebrity
followed this action. Any agent joining after stage time N ǫ
4
is either a non-celebrity in
which case he follows the action of the first celebrity (follows from Lemma 3.7) or is himself
a celebrity in which case he sees the same strict majority of initial J celebrities which he
mimics. We conclude that conditional on the event B¯ ∩ A¯ all agents taking decision after
time N ǫ
4
take an optimal action with probability1 − ǫ
4
and our claim follows. 
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Theorem 3.9. For any ǫ > 0 there exists Nˆ such that for any N > Nˆ the social network H
is ǫ-efficient .
Proof: Recall the term qσ =
∑
k∈K λ
kProbk(σ) introduced the reduction Lemma (Lemma
3.4). In the uniform setting it is easy to see that qσ =
1
N !
which suggests that the reduction
constructed in Lemma 3.4 is to a single issue with a uniform order. The theorem now follows
from Lemma 3.8. 
3.3 An adversarial order
We now consider an adversarial setting regarding the weights assigned to the various issues
and the corresponding order at which agents decide. As we show, we can resort to a random
graph in order to obtain ǫ-efficiency. The random graph we obtain will be central in proving
the existence of a deterministic observability graph for any set of issues and random per-
mutations. The random graph we pursue is, in fact, a random celebrities graph where the
set of celebrities, M , is not necessarily the set of agents 1, . . . ,M but is rather chosen ran-
domly. The way we choose a random celebrities graph is by randomly relabeling the agents
and then applying the standard celebrities graph to the new labeling—agents whose labels
are 1, . . . ,M are designated as celebrities and those labeled M + 1, . . . , N are designated as
commoners.
More formally, let τ : N → N be a random permutation of the names of the agents
used by the designer (this is different from the order they took decision). In particular let τ
be similar to σU in that it chooses each permutation with equal probability. Let H be the
(random) celebrities graph where agent k is a celebrity if and only if τ(k) ≤M .
Before considering the case of random relabeling let us study the case where the relabeling
is deterministic:
Lemma 3.10. Let τ and σ be two deterministic permutations of the N agents and consider
the following two social learning challenges which differ on the order by which decisions are
made and corresponding social networks:
1. Agents take decision according to the order σ with signals
sτ(1), sτ(2), . . . , sτ(N) and H is the bi-clique where agents τ
−1(1), . . . , τ−1(M) are desig-
nated as celebrities.
2. Agents take decision according to the permutation σ(τ−1) with signals s1, s2, . . . , sN
and G is the bi-clique with agents 1, . . . ,M designated as celebrities.
For any signal profile s1, s2, . . . , sN and for any stage t, the signal, the action and the location
(celebrity or not) of the agent taking decision at time t in both challenges are the same.
See the appendix for the proof of Lemma 3.10.
Note that Lemma 3.10 is false if we were to assume that the signal vector in both networks
is the same (e.g., had we replaced sτ(1), sτ(2), . . . , sτ(N) with s1, s2, . . . , sN in H). However, as
we now turn to show, whenever the signal vector is random, as in our model, the following
holds.
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Lemma 3.11. Let τ and σ be two deterministic permutations of the N agents and consider
the following two social learning challenges which differ on the order by which decisions are
made and corresponding social networks
1. Agents take decision according to the order σ and H is the bi-clique where agents
τ−1(1), . . . , τ−1(M) are designated as celebrities.
2. Agents take decision according to the permutation σ(τ−1) and G is the bi-clique with
agents 1, . . . ,M designated as celebrities.
The expected number of agents taking the optimal action is the same, where the expectation
is taken with respect to the random signal.
See the appendix for the proof of Lemma 3.11.
As the above holds for any deterministic permutations it must also hold for random
permutations. Therefore we now have:
Corollary 3.12. Let τ and σ be two random permutations of the N agents and consider
the following two social learning challenges which differ on the order by which decisions are
made and corresponding social networks
1. Agents take decision according to the order σ and H is the bi-clique where agents
τ−1(1), . . . , τ−1(M) are designated as celebrities.
2. Agents take decision according to the permutation σ(τ−1) and G is the bi-clique with
agents 1, . . . ,M designated as celebrities.
The expected number of agents taking the optimal action is the same, where the expectation
is taken with respect to the random signal and the two permutations, σ and τ .
Let us consider the special case where τ is chosen from the uniform distribution over the
set of all permutations. In this case we observe that the random permutation σ(τ−1) is also
uniform over all permutations. This implies that whenever agents take decision according to
the permutation σ(τ−1) and G is the bi-clique with agents 1, . . . ,M designated as celebrities
we are back to the case of Theorem 3.9.
We are now ready to prove the existence of a random celebrities graph that is ǫ-efficient
for a large enough society. Given ǫ > 0 and a set of N agents let H denote the random
bi-clique where τ is chosen uniformly over all permutations and agent n is a celebrity if and
only if τ(n) ≤M = 8
ǫ
ln4
ǫ
. Then:
Theorem 3.13. For any ǫ > 0 there exists Nˆ , such that for any N > Nˆ the random network
H is ǫ-efficient for any single issue and any order τ .
Proof: WLOG assume ǫ ≤ (0.5−δ). As the permutation σ(τ−1) chooses all permutations
with equal probability the claim follows from Theorem 3.9 and Corollary 3.12. 
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Corollary 3.14. For any ǫ > 0 there exists Nˆ , such that for any N > Nˆ the random network
H is ǫ-efficient for any set of issues, K, and vector of K probability distributions over the
permutations, {probk}k∈K.
Proof: This follows directly Theorem 3.13 and Lemma 3.4. 
3.4 Arbitrary permutations
In the previous section we applied the celebrities network in a random fashion to provide a
social network that works well for any (adversarial) order. However, let us consider, once
again, the Bayesian setting where the order by which decisions are made is unknown but the
distribution over orders is known. In contrast with Section 3.2 we will not assume uniform
weights over all orders but an arbitrary vector of weights, wσ.
Theorem 3.15. For any ǫ > 0 there exists Nˆ such that for any N > Nˆ and any vector of
weights wσ there exists a (deterministic) social network that is ǫ-efficient .
Proof: By Theorem 3.13 we know that for ǫ > 0 there exist Nˆ such that for any
N > Nˆ there exists a random graph that is ǫ-efficient for a given issue and a random order
of decision making. Recall the definition of an ǫ-efficient network for a single issue requires
that the expected proportion of agents that take an optimal action is larger than 1− ǫ. This
expectation can be computed as an expectation over the conditional expectation where the
conditioning is over the realized graphs. This implies that at least one of these conditional
proportions is larger or equal 1 − ǫ and so the corresponding graph must be ǫ-efficient for
the single issue. The theorem folloes from applying the reduction lemma (Lemma 3.4).7 
4 Preferential Attachment Networks
The celebrities graph was shown to exhibit asymptotic efficiency. This settles the main
foundational question we tackled in this paper. Given that, an interesting question is how
do actual social networks, related to celebrities graph, perform. Naturally, such realistic
networks exhibit a different structure and possibly different dynamics. In this section we
report results from a simulation of social learning over preferential attachment graphs with
a random order of agents that choose an action based on a naive majority rule. Given the
reduction obtaned in Lemma 3.4 we suffice in demonstrating the performance in single issue
settings.
Preferential attachment graphs are arguably prevalent in reality (e.g., online social net-
works) [13]. A Preferential attachment graph is a graph that results from the following
preferential attachment dynamics:
• The graph starts with k nodes all connected to each other (the seed).
7This result is in the spirit of the so-called probabilistic method [2].
15
• New nodes arrive sequentially and connect to some of the existing nodes.
• Each new node is connected to k nodes selected randomly, without returns, from the
subsequent nodes, where the probability of node i, pi, is monotonic in the degree of i,
denoted di.
We specifically study scale-free graphs for which the probability of connecting with each
node is proportional to the power of the degree, pi =
dαi
Σjdαj
. We denote such a graph by
PowPA(n, k, α) or PowPA(α) when n and k are clear from the context. Note that as α
grows that graph approximates a graph where all agents connect only with all the seed nodes
and so approximates a celebrities graph. In addition the difference between the described
limiting graph and the celebrities graph is that in the former the celebrities are connected
among themselves. The dynamics could diverge only when the first celebrity does not observe
a clear majority and consequently follows his own signal. As this event occurs with low
probability the results obtained for the celebrities graph are also true for this limiting graph.
The case PowPA(1) is known in the literature as the Barabasi-Albert preferential attach-
ment graph [7] and was shown to approximate various real-life networks (e.g., the internet
and citation networks) and in particular some social networks. The dynamics we simulate
are based on a majority rule and replace the Bayesian updating scheme underlying our the-
oretical results. This is done due to the complexity of implementation and running time. In
a majority dynamics agents take the action taken by the majority of their neighbors when
also accounting for the optimal action implied from their private signal. We do so following
a large body of work on emergent conventions with majority dynamics starting with [19].
Related dynamics have been discussed in [11] for some preferential attachment graphs. The
latter however refers to stochastic pairing of agents in a game, rather than to social learn-
ing and efficient information aggregation. Notice that majority dynamics are close to the
Bayesian dynamics we employed in our theory, in graphs such as the celebrities graph.
4.1 The mechanics of the simulation
Given the parameters n, k, α we begin each Monte-Carlo simulation by generating a graph.
We then randomly choose the state of nature with equal probabilities and finally proceed to
simulate the agents, as follows:
• Each agent is associated with a node in the graph, and a random permutation over the
agents is selected, determining their order.
• For each agent we randomly choose a signal.
• Each agent, in its turn, chooses an action according to a majority rule, where the
majority is taken over the set of decisions made by the predecessors he observes (his
neighbors on the graph) and his own signal, where the signal serves also as a tie-
breaking rule.
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For a fixed triplet of parameters (n, k, α), we run many iterations of the simulation. The
output we report, the success rate, is the average over the iterations of the proportion of
agents whose action equals the state of nature.
4.2 Simulation results
Before we turn to report detailed results let us note the two primary conclusions from the
simulation. First, the efficiency results we get for Bayesian dynamics in the celebrities graph
are robust in the sense that preferential attachment graphs with majority dynamics exhibit
high efficiency. Second, the efficiency results are valid for surprisingly small populations of
agents – as small as n = 1000.
In the following three tables we report the simulation results for 7 different graphs. Each
table corresponds to a different seed size and shows how the efficiency results vary with
the signal parameter p. All the reported results are with respect to 10000 iterations of the
simulation.
simulation results n=1000, k=20, 10,000 iterations
Graph
Average Success Rate
p=0.6 p=0.7 p=0.8 p=0.9
Clique 0.6915 0.8438 0.9407 0.9876
PowPA
α =
1
0.8635 0.9628 0.9825 0.9926
α =
2
0.8725 0.9623 0.9800 0.9913
α =
3
0.9047 0.9646 0.9809 0.9906
α =
4
0.9108 0.9661 0.9800 0.9904
α =
5
0.9134 0.9664 0.9804 0.9906
Celebrity 0.9176 0.9670 0.9809 0.9910
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simulation results n=1000, k=30, 10,000 iterations
Graph
Average Success Rate
p=0.6 p=0.7 p=0.8 p=0.9
Clique 0.6915 0.8438 0.9407 0.9876
PowPA
α =
1
0.8427 0.9665 0.9879 0.9951
α =
2
0.8436 0.9639 0.9860 0.9942
α =
3
0.8864 0.9682 0.9855 0.9938
α =
4
0.8968 0.9698 0.9859 0.9935
α =
5
0.9049 0.9711 0.9859 0.9934
Celebrity 0.906 0.9716 0.9862 0.994
simulation results n=1000, k=40, 10,000 iterations
Graph
Average Success Rate
p=0.6 p=0.7 p=0.8 p=0.9
Clique 0.6915 0.8438 0.9407 0.9876
PowPA
α =
1
0.8295 0.9634 0.9901 0.9963
α =
2
0.8300 0.9600 0.9879 0.9956
α =
3
0.8640 0.9651 0.9882 0.9952
α =
4
0.8752 0.9676 0.9874 0.9949
α =
5
0.8799 0.9720 0.9880 0.9951
Celebrity 0.8903 0.9718 0.9887 0.9956
Note that consistently the clique underperforms any of the preferential attachment graphs,
which in turn, do not do as well as the celebrities graph. However, as α increases they do
come very close. This observation is robust to the signal strength p and the seed size k.
5 Deterministic Arrival Order: Multi-layer Guinea Pigs
Our work so far has focused on learning approximately optimal actions in large populations.
This may not be of interest when considering small populations which begs the question of
characterizing the optimal network, as opposed to showing an approximately optimal one.
In this section we demonstrate the underlying difficulty of this question by restricting the
18
optimal design question to a scenario where agents’ order is well known. In particular we
examine the intuitive question of whether an optimal guinea pig design is actually an optimal
design and therefore the optimization problem boils down to identifying the optimal number
of guinea pigs as a function of the population size. This last question has been studied in
Sgroi [18].
Recall that Corollary 3.3 verifies the intuition that a guinea pig design yields approximate
efficiency for large enough populations. Unfortunately, as we now argue, despite this it is
not the optimal design. In fact, simulation results show that for small populations (n=100)
this is quite far from the first best design.
We now turn to introduce the “multi-layer guinea pigs” network which is instrumental
for our argument:
Definition 5.1. Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents and assume that agents arrive
according to the natural order. For any sequence of integers 0 < n1 < n2 < . . . < nk ≤ n
consider the graph G(n1, n2, . . . , nk) on N with the following edges: (v, w) ∈ E if and only
if ∃j such that min(v, w) ≤
∑
i≤j ni < max(v, w).
In other words, agents 1, . . . , n1 are guinea pigs. Thereafter each cohort of agents ni +
1, . . . , ni+1 see the actions chosen by all previous cohorts but do not observe actions taken
by their cohort peers. Finally, all agents from nk + 1 onwards observe all predecessors. In
particular the graph G(n1) is our standard guinea pigs graph and so is a special case of a
multi-layer guinea pigs graph. Fix a precision level δ > 0 for the signal distribution. For
every observation graph G we let XG be the expected welfare, i.e., the expected number of
agents that act correctly under the observation graph G. For every number of agents n let
s(n) be the optimal number of guinea pigs that should be sacrificed to maximize the welfare
of the society in the guinea pigs graph. Let Xn be the optimal welfare in the guinea pigs
graph as a function of n.
Theorem 5.2. For every large enough n there exists a multi-layer graph G = G(n1, n2, . . . , nk)
such that Xn < XG.
Proof. Since, limn→∞
Xn
n
= 1 we clearly have that
limn→∞
s(n)
n
= 0. Therefore we can choose a large enough n0 such that Xn−s(n) > (
1
2
+ δ)(n−
s(n)) for every n > n0. Let n1 = s(n), n2 = s(n− s(n)), and G = G(n1, n1 + n2). We claim
that Xn < XG. To see this, let p1 be the probability that after observing the first n1 = s(n)
agents, the remaining n−s(n) assign the true state a probability that is strictly greater than
1
2
+ δ. Similarly, let p2 be the probability that after observing the first n1 agents, the agents
in n− n1 assign the true state a probability smaller than
1
2
− δ. Let p3 = 1− p1− p2 > 0 be
the remaining probability. We can couple together the information structure in the guinea
pigs graph G′ = G(n1) and in G = G(n1, n1 + n2). In particular, we compare the decision
of the society in the two structures for identical realization of signals. With probability p1
in the two graphs it holds that the n− n1 remaining agents make the correct decision. This
is clearly true for G′ and also for G since if the agents in n2 assign the state θ a probability
that is greater than 1
2
+ δ, then their optimal decision is to ignore their private information
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and follow the agents in n1. Similarly, with probability p2 in the two graphs the n − n1
other agents make the incorrect decision. The distinction between G and G′ happens in the
third case where with probability p3 the information from the first n1 = s(n) make the other
agents follow their private signal in G′. Since the other n−n1 agents play according to their
signal, their expected success probability is (1
2
+ δ)(n − n1). By construction the expected
payoff of the other n− n1 agents in G is precisely Xn−n1 > (
1
2
+ δ)(n− n1). This shows that
Xn < XG. 
Intuition suggests that the quantitative improvement of the multi-layer guinea pig graph
over the single layered one is insignificant for large populations. We now use simulations to
demonstrate the improvement for intermediate populations sized (n = 30, 50, 70, 100). Each
row compares the efficiency of two graphs: the optimal guinea pig graph and the optimal
multi-layered with layers of a constant size. The results reported all pertain to signals for
which precision is p = 0.6. The average success rate is over 100000 iterations.
simulation results, p = 0.6
Population
size
Graph
type
Success
Rate
Layer
size
30 guinea pigs 0.7028 10
30 multi-layer 0.7237 7
50 guinea pigs 0.7369 16
50 multi-layer 0.7590 11
70 guinea pigs 0.7637 22
70 multi-layer 0.7845 15
100 guinea pigs 0.7902 30
100 multi-layer 0.8107 21
Note that improvement rates are consistently around 3%. These would even increase if
we move to multi-layer graphs with varying layer size.
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6 Appendix: missing proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.2:
Proof: Note that as E = ∅ the only information that agents have is their signal. Maximizing
expected utility implies that each agent takes the action equal to the signal received. Let
X be the random variable that counts the number of agents whose signal equals the state
of nature and note that X has a binomial distribution with parameters (N, 0.5 + δ) and so
E(X) = N(0.5 + δ) and V ar(X) = N(0.5 + δ)(0.5− δ).
Prob(X <
N
2
+ 1) = Prob(E(X)−X > E(X)− (
N
2
+ 1)) ≤
≤ Prob(E(X)−X > E(X)− (
N
2
+ 1))+
Prob(X −E(X) > E(X)− (
N
2
+ 1)) =
= Prob(|E(X)−X| > E(X)− (
N
2
+ 1)). (1)
Applying Chebyshev inequality:
Prob(|E(X)−X| > E(X)− (
N
2
+ 1)) ≤
V ar(X)
(N
2
−E(X))2
=
=
N(0.5− δ)(0.5 + δ)
(N
2
−N(0.5 + δ))2
=
(0.5− δ)(0.5 + δ)
N(δ)2
. (2)
For N ≥ 1
4δ2ǫ
we get 4(0.5−δ)(0.5+δ)
N(2δ)2
≤ ǫ, which, together with inequalities 1 and 2 prove
the result. 
Proof of Lemma 3.5:
Proof: Prob({σU{1, . . . , J} ∩M = ∅) =
Prob(σU(1) ∩M = ∅)Prob(σU(2) ∩M = ∅|σU(1) ∩M = ∅)
. . . P rob(σU(J) ∩M = ∅|({σU{1, . . . , J − 1} ∩M = ∅) =
N−M
N
N−M−1
N−1
. . . N−M−J+1
N−J+1
> (N−M−J
N−J
)J . Therefore it is sufficient to show that (N−M−J
N−J
)J ≥
1 − ǫ. However, this inequality is equivalent to showing that N − J ≥ M
1−(1−ǫ)
1
J
. Recalling
that N − J ≥ 2Jk
ǫ
it suffices to show that 2Jk
ǫ
≥ M
1−(1−ǫ)
1
J
.
It is straightforward to verify that the following inequality holds: e−2 ≤ (1− 1
x
)x ≤ e−1 for
all x ≥ 2.8 By substituting 2J
ǫ
for x (note that indeed 2J
ǫ
≥ 2) we have that e−ǫ ≤ (1− ǫ
2J
)J .
As 1 − ǫ ≤ e−ǫ we conclude that 1 − ǫ ≤ (1 − ǫ
2J
)J or equivalently (1 − ǫ)
1
J ≤ (1 − ǫ
2J
),
8The proof of this inequality follows from three simple observations: (1) limx→∞(1 −
1
x
)x = e−1, (2)
e−2 ≤ (1 − 1
2
)2; and (3) (1− 1
x
)x is an increasing function for x ≥ 2.
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which in turn implies that M
1−(1−ǫ)
1
J
≤ M
1−(1− ǫ
2J
)
. By simple manipulations this implies that
2JM
ǫ
≤ M
1−(1−ǫ)
1
J
as required. 
Proof of Lemma 3.6
Proof: Prob(σU{J + 1, ..., Nǫ} ∩M 6= ∅|σU{1, ..., J} ∩M = ∅) =
1− Prob(σU{J + 1, .., Nǫ} ∩M = ∅|σU{1, .., J} ∩M = ∅)
= 1− N−J−M
N−J
N−J−M−1
N−J−1
...
N−J−M−(Nǫ−J)+1
N−J−(Nǫ−J)+1
≥
1− (N−J−M
N−J
)Nǫ−J .
Therefore it is sufficient to show (N−J−M
N−J
)Nǫ−J ≤ ǫ. As N ≥ 2J
ǫ
it is enough to show that
(N−J−M
N−J
)
Nǫ
2 ≤ ǫ.
Once again we resort to the inequality (1− 1
x
)x ≤ e−1, ∀x ≥ 2 and apply it to x = N−J
M
(note that indeed N−J
M
≥ 2). Thus (N−J−M
N−J
)
Nǫ
2 ≤ e−1
Nǫ
2
M
N−J ≤ ǫ, where the last inequality
follows from our assumption that M ≥ 2
ǫ
ln(1
ǫ
). 
Proof of Lemma 3.10:
Proof: We prove this by induction. For t = 1 the first agent to take decision in H is σ−1(1)
and he has the signal sτ(σ−1(1)). On the other hand the first agent to take decision in G is
τ(σ−1(1)) which has the same signal sτ(σ−1(1)). Both have no additional information and
so both also take the same action. Also, in H agent σ−1(1) is a celebrity if and only if
τ(σ−1(1)) ≤ M which is exactly the condition for agent τ(σ−1(1)), the one taking decision
at time t = 1 in G, to be a celebrity.
Now assume the induction hypothesis holds for all agents taking decision at times 1, . . . , t.
Similar arguments as those made in t = 1 show that the agents taking decision at time t+1
in both networks have the same signal and are on the same side of the bipartite graph.
By the induction hypothesis the agents taking decision at time t + 1 also see the network
spanned by the agents taking decision at times 1, . . . , t (where the isomorphism function of
agents is by the time they take decision) and therefore they are isomorphic. In addition, the
isomorphism saves the action profile. Hence the agents taking decision at time t have the
same additional information and so once again must take a similar action. 
Proof of Lemma 3.11:
Proof: Assume agents in H receive the signal vector s while those in G receive the signal
vector τ(s). From Lemma 3.10 we conclude that the expected number of agents to take
an optimal action in both cases is equal. In addition note that as any signal vector s
has the same probability as the signal vector τ(s) (this is the exchangeability property of
conditionally independent signals). Therefore, as the function s → τ(s) is one-to-one and
onto the distribution over action profiles in G when agents receive the signal s and when
agents receive the signal τ(s) is the same . The claim now follows. 
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